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TRUE ACCESS TO THE COURTS FOR CITIZENS WORKING TO
PROTECT NATURAL RESOURCES: INCORPORATING




The Minnesota Legislature, through the Minnesota Environmental
Rights Act ("MERA"), sought to improve the natural environment of the
state by providing an "adequate civil remedy to protect air, water, land and
other natural resources located within the state from pollution, impairment
and destruction."' In reading this statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court
stated that preservation of natural resources is, ". . . superior to all other . .
. concerns." 2
* Michael Wietecki is a 2006 graduate of the University of St. Thomas School of Law
and is a Masters of Science candidate at the University of Minnesota College of Natural
Resources. The author thanks Dean Jerome Organ for his guidance, David Rosedahl for
his assistance, his parents, and Jennifer Hanson for her invaluable insight and support.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01 (West 2005). Purpose:
The legislature finds and declares that each person is entitled by right to
the protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land, and
other natural resources located within the state and that each person has
the responsibility to contribute to the protection, preservation, and
enhancement thereof. The legislature further declares its policy to
create and maintain within the state conditions under which human
beings and nature can exist in productive harmony in order that present
and future generations may enjoy clean air and water, productive land,
and other natural resources with which this state has been endowed.
Accordingly, is in the public interest to provide an adequate civil
remedy to protect air, water, land and other natural resources located
within the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
Id (emphasis added).
2 Krmpotich v. City of Duluth, 474 N.W.2d 392, 400 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (quoting
Floodwood-Fine Lakes Citizens Group v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 287 N.W.2d
390, 399 (Minn. 1979). The court concluded "MERA expresse[d] a 'paramount' concern
for the preservation of natural resources," which makes preservation of natural resources
"superior to all other concerns" when balancing concerns. Id.
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MERA creates a cause of action and legal remedy for any person
bringing a claim for protection of Minnesota's natural resources,
regardless of whether standards or regulations exist concerning the alleged
violation.3 Thus, the MERA citizen suit provision could be an effective
means to uphold the stated policy of Minnesota:
The legislature further declares its policy to create and
maintain within this state conditions under which human
beings and nature can exist in productive harmony in order
that present and future generations may enjoy clean air and
water, productive land, and other natural resources with
which this state has been endowed.
The broad grant of standing in section 11 6B.03 to citizens, coupled
with the noble policy laid out in section 116B.01, give Minnesotans the
tools to act as private attorney generals and defend their environment
against degradation, but bringing such a claim demands considerable
expenditure of time and resources. Unlike the vast majority of federal
environmental citizen suits provisions, MERA does not provide for
recovery of reasonable attorney fees or costs.5 Because the adversely
affected party pursuing a claim under MERA bears the cost of litigation,
3 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 subdiv. 1. Parties:
Any person residing within the state . . . may maintain a civil action in
the district court for declaratory or equitable relief in the name of the
state of Minnesota against any person, for the protection of the air,
water, land, or other natural resources located within the state, whether
publicly or privately owned, from pollution, impairment, or destruction
Id.
4 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01.
5 Federal Citizen Suits that provide for the recovery of costs and attorney fees: Clean
Water Act, § 505(d), 42 U.S.C. § 1365(d); Clean Air Act, § 304(d), 42 U.S.C § 7604(d)
(costs of litigation may be awarded to ". . . any party, whenever the court determines
such award is appropriate."); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §
6972(a) (Supp. III 1985); Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42
U.S.C. § 11046(f); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619(c)(2);
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9659(f).
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MERA effectively imposes an economic burden that discourages those
parties from bringing an action to protect Minnesota's natural resources.
State agencies carry the burden of protecting Minnesota's natural
resources to maintain the goals the legislature espoused in section
116B.01, but those agencies will never have the funding to adequately do
so. As Professor Joseph Sax envisioned, the state environmental citizen
suit provision creates a statutory right for citizens to be protected from
pollution and impairment or destruction of natural resources, in order to
relieve some of the enforcement burden from perpetually under-funded
state agencies.6
Instead of making citizen actions that may effectively advance
MERA's policy prohibitively costly by failing to reimburse parties for the
costs incurred, the MERA claim should be made more accessible by
affording the citizen an opportunity to recover the costs and fees of a
lawsuit they brought to protect a primary state interest. Because MERA
does not include a provision by which affected parties can retrieve
attorney's fees and costs, the statute effectively provides standing only to
those with considerable financial resources, or for those who use it as a
shield of last-resort.
If the legislature's stated primary interest in protecting and
preserving natural resources is to be realized, and state agencies are unable
accomplish adequate protection, Minnesota's citizenry must be
empowered through MERA to insure that interest. This empowerment
comes through access to MERA, and MERA will only become accessible
if it is amended to allow for recovery of reasonable attorney's fees and
costs to citizens effectuating that interest.
6 See JOSEPH L. SAX, DEFENDING THE ENVIRONMENT A STRATEGY FOR CITIZEN ACTION
(Knopf 1970). Professor Sax recognized that agencies lack the funding and the political
will to adequately protect natural resources. This recognition was not necessarily a
criticism of such agencies but rather an acceptance that they were not the solution to the
?roblem of resource degradation. See generally id.
See County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973); infra Part 3. While the
grant of standing under MERA is broad, that grant is only relevant when a party has
enough resources or enough personal stake in the outcome of the proceeding to avail
themselves of the cost.
149
Mo. ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REV., Vol. 14, No. 1
Part I of this paper discusses the history and development of
environmental citizen suits, and provides an overview of several federal
and state environmental citizen suits.
Part 1I is an overview of fee shifting and the American Rule of fee
shifting; this part also discusses how the American Rule has been
expressly waived for many federal environmental citizen suits and for
non-environmental Minnesota citizen suits that grant a public benefit.
Part III looks specifically at the Minnesota Environmental Rights
Act (MERA), its history, effectiveness (or lack thereof), and use.
Part IV proposes model language for amending MERA and
discusses how that language can be implemented to effectuate the primary
interest of the state in conserving and protecting the invaluable natural
resources of Minnesota.
The article fully supports, and recommends immediate enactment
of MN H.F No. 4158, which will effectively amend MERA to accomplish
access to the courts for Minnesota's citizens.
I. ENVIRONMENTAL CITIZEN SUITS
A. General Citizen Suit Theory, History and Development
The roots of environmental citizen suits can be traced back to 1388
and Richard II as a way to deal with serious public health risks.' The 1388
statute permitted individuals that were "grieved" by acts of pollution to
bring an action for protection of the King's commons from pollution.9
Earlier in the 14th century Parliament enacted a statute allocating a share
of damages assessed against the transgressor to the bringer of the citizen
8 The Statute of 12 Rich. II, ch. 13 (1388). See Barry Boyer & Errol Meidinger,
Privatizing Regulatory Enforcement: A Preliminary Assessment of Citizen Suits Under
the Federal Environmental Laws, 34 Buff.L.Rev. 833, 947 (1985). The statute granted
every man the ability to sue in the name of "Our Lord Our King" for specific
transgressions such as dumping waste into ditches or water. Boyer describes the statute
as providing for a "dual system of enforcement: either public officials or others who
'feel themselves grieved' or who 'will complain' could bring enforcement actions." Id.
9 Susan George, William J. Snape, III, & Rina Rodriguez, The Public in Action: Using
State Citizen Suit Statutes to Protect Biodiversity, 6 U. BALT. J. ENVTL. L. 1, 9-10 (1997).
150
MANNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACT & ATTORNEY'S FEES
suit (an early fee-shifting provision).' 0 These statutes appear to be the
historical basis by which the sovereign recognizes its inability to police
environmental wrongs effectively on its own, and enlists citizens to
support the sovereign by granting victims the right to sue in place of the
sovereign. They also symbolize the sovereign's willingness to reward
individuals that bring suits on behalf of the sovereign.
Substantively, the 1388 statute had two functions, it provided for
clean up of past pollution and compelled the Chancery to act to prevent
future pollution. This dual nature laid the foundation for many of today's
10 See Statute made at Westminster In the Fifth Year of the Reign of K. Edward the Third
After the Conquest, 5 Edw. III, ch. 5 (1331). A 1331 statute, for example, allocated one-
fourth of any fines imposed on stallholders selling goods after the close of a fair to "every
Man that will sue for our Lord the King." Id. See also Boyer & Meidinger supra note 8,
at 947. The evolution of fee shifting will be discussed in more detail, infra Part 2.
" See infra, Part 2 for further discussion of fee shifting.
12 The Statute of Rich. II ch. 13, reads in relevant part as follows:
For that so much Dung and Filth of the Garbage and Intrails as well as
of Beasts killed, as other of Corruptions, be cast and put in Ditches,
Rivers, and other Waters, . . . that the Air there is greatly corrupt to
infect, and many Maladies and other intolerable Diseases do daily
happen, . . . to the great Annoyance, Damage and Peril of the
Inhabitants, Dwellers, Repairers, and Travelers . . . ; (2) . . . all they
which cast and lay all such Annoyances . .. in . . . Waters . . . shall
cause them utterly to be removed, avoided, and carried away [before
the next Feast of St. Michael] . . . every one upon Pain to lose and to
forfeit to our Lord the King [twenty liver] . . .; (3) . .. the Mayors and
Bailiffs ... shall compel the same to be done upon like Pain; (4) And if
any feel himself grieved, that it be not done in the Manner aforesaid,
and will thereupon complain come into the Chancery, there to show
why the said penalty should not be levied on him, and if he cannot
excuse himself, the said penalty should be levied of him; (5) . . . none
of what Condition soever he be, [shall] cause to be cast or thrown from
henceforth any such Annoyance ... into the .. . Waters; (6) and if any
do, he shall be called by Writ before the Chancellor, at his Suit that will
complain; and if he be found guilty, he shall be punished after the
discretion of the Chancellor.
2 STAT. AT LARGE 382 (0. Rufhead ed. 1763). Boyer & Meidinger, supra note
8, at 947 n.279.
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private causes of action, as agency action compelling and conducting
regulation.13
The idea of the private cause of action migrated to the New World
and was well accepted and a well-known practice in early American
courts.14 As a fixture in English and American jurisprudence, the private
cause of action (citizen suits) has been implied in essentially every case
where a statute was enacted to protect a personal interest.'5 This implied
that a private citizen has the right to employ the courts to guarantee a
benefit or utilize a protection bestowed on him by statute.' 6 Through the
private cause of action the individual is empowered to enforce the statute's
guarantees without action by the state. Where the action by the private
party can be commenced, and effectively fulfill the purpose of the statute
without state action, the state conserves its scarce financial resources.
The right of private action, or citizen suit, is also frequently written
into statutes to ensure its availability to citizens. Congress and state
legislatures have statutorily authorized many mechanisms whereby
citizens can bring a legal action to enforce various laws, including many
13 See generally Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on Awards ofAttorney's Fees Against the
Federal Government, 25 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 733, 776-77 (1993) [hereinafter Sisk Primer].
Using the Clean Air Act as an example, the government made itself liable in two different
capacities: first, as a regulator for failure to fulfill a statutory obligation and second, the
federal government (or any person) may be challenged in its capacity as a polluter that is
in violation of environmental restrictions. Id. at 776-78. These functions will be
discussed further infra Part 2.
14 California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 299-300 (1981) (Stevens, J., concurring).
Justice Stevens said, "in my view, the Members of Congress merely assumed that the
federal courts would follow the ancient maxim 'ubijus, ibi remedium' and imply a
private right of action." Id. at 300. See Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. 33, 39-
40 (1916). In Rigsby, the statute in question creates liability for injuries suffered by the
plaintiff, and although there is no express language in the statute creating a private action
for recovering on the injury, the right of a private action to remedy an injury has "never
been doubted." Id. at 39.
" Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 300 n.3. "So, in every case, where a statute enacts, or
prohibits a thing for the benefit of a person, he shall have a remedy upon the same statute
for the thing enacted for his advantage, or for the recompence of a wrong done to him
contrary to the said law." Id. (quoting 1 Comyns' Digest 433, 442 (1822)).
16 See id. at 299-300.
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environmental statutes.' 7 In some instances citizens are given authority to
act in place of the state attorney general if they can meet standing
requirements.18 A broad grant of standing is the hallmark of current
environmental citizen suit provisions, and is ubiquitous throughout these
statutes, thereby overriding the common law nuisance standing
requirement.19
B. Modern Federal Environmental Citizen Suit Provisions -
Codification of the Lorax's Legal Standing
"I am the Lorax. I speak for the trees. I speak for the trees,
for the trees have no tongues." 20
If the Lorax, in Dr. Seuss's story of environmental destruction,
would have been able to secure jurisdictional standing in court over the
fictional pollution site called The Street of the Lifted Lorax, the Once-ler
may have been forced to listen to his pleas, and the Brown Bar-ba-loots,
17 See Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000), Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)
for examples of federal citizen suit provision. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a- 16
(2006), MICH. COMP. LAWS. § 324.20135, MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 (West 2005) for
examples of state citizen suit provisions.
1 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31 subdiv. 3a. Private remedies:
In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person
injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1
may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and
disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable
attorney's fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the
court. The court may, as appropriate, enter a consent judgment or
decree without the finding of illegality. In any action brought by the
attorney general pursuant to this section, the court may award any of
the remedies allowable under this subdivision.
Id. Subdivision 1, as referenced in Subdivision 3a, does not contain any environmental
laws. This is a separate area where the legislature would be well suited to amend the
statute and include relevant environmental laws. Including such laws would allow
Minnesota citizens to act as private attorney generals to uphold the environmental laws of
the state. This will be discussed further infra Part 4.
9 See James R. May, The Availability ofState Environmental Citizen Suits, 18 NAT. RES.
& ENV'T 53, 53-54 (2004) [hereinafter May Availability]; supra note 17.20 Dr. Seuss, The Lorax (Random House 1971).
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Swomee-Swans and Humming-Fish may have been able to stay amongst
the Truffula Trees.21 But, without a statutory grant of standing the Lorax
was powerless against the destructive forces of the Once-ler's industrial
might.22
Congress, in its wisdom, invited citizens to step into the mossy
brown suit of the Lorax and "speak for the trees" 23 by allowing "any
person" to act as a "private attorney[s] general" and "commence a civil
action on his own behalf' against "any person" for the violation of an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) prohibition or regulation, or to
bring an action against the EPA for its own failure "to perform any act or
duty . .. which is not discretionary." 24 This explicit decision to include the
21 See generally id.
22 d
23 id.
24 See 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) (2000); 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a). These two statutes contain
slightly different language but accomplish the same grant of standing of a citizen to bring
a citizen suit:
[A]ny citizen may commence a civil action on his own behalf (1)
against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the
eleventh amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to be in
violation of (A) an effluent standard or limitation under this chapter or
(B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State with respect to such
a standard or limitation, or (2) against the Administrator where there is
alleged a failure of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under
this chapter which is not discretionary with the Administrator.
33 U.S.C. § 1365.
[A]ny person may commence a civil action on his own behalf (1)
against any person (including (i) the United States, and (ii) any other
governmental instrumentality or agency to the extent permitted by the
Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution) who is alleged to have
violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation has been
repeated) or to be in violation of (A) an emission standard or limitation
under this chapter or (B) an order issued by the Administrator or a State
with respect to such a standard or limitation, (2) against the
Administrator where there is alleged a failure of the Administrator to
perform any act or duty under this chapter which is not discretionary
with the Administrator, or (3) against any person who proposes to
construct or constructs any new or modified major emitting facility
without a permit required under part C of subchapter I of this chapter
(relating to significant deterioration of air quality) or part D of
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public in the enforcement of environmental regulations was Congress'
recognition that budgetary constraints and political forces impaired the
abilit of governmental agencies to enforce such laws adequately on their
own. 5 In a nation of limited resources and innumerable potential
polluters, the government cannot police all potential violators of
environmental laws.26 Because of the indisputable reality that government
does not have the ability to patrol all potential polluters at all times, the
public was deputized to act as private attorneys general to protect the
environment.
Congress chose to deliberately increase access to courts to ensure
citizens' ability to "speak for the trees" 27 and participate in the legal
process by expressly discarding jurisdictional barriers such as standing. 2 8
Congressional intent became manifest with the inclusion of a citizen suit
provision in each substantive environmental statute enacted between 1970
and 1980.29 In fact, Congress perceived that citizens have such an
subchapter I of this chapter (relating to nonattainment) or who is
alleged to have violated (if there is evidence that the alleged violation
has been repeated) or to be in violation of any condition of such permit.
42 U.S.C. § 7604(a). These statutes also illustrate the dual nature of federal
environmental citizen suits to compel agency action, and to regulate conduct of polluters.
See Sisk Primer, supra note 13, at 776-77.
25 Peter H. Lehner, The Efficiency of Citizen Suits, 2 ALB. L. ENvTL. OUTLOOK 4 (1995).
See SAX, supra note 6.
26 Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental
Protection. 12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL'Y F. 39, 43 (2001). Mr. Adler observed that
because of limited governmental resources, citizens were enabled to supplement
enforcement efforts. Id.
27 See Suess, supra note 20.
28 Friends of the Earth v. Carey, 535 F.2d 165, 172-73 (2d Cir. 1976). "[T]he citizen
suits provision reflected a deliberate choice by Congress to widen citizen access to the
courts, as a supplemental and effective assurance that the Act would be implemented and
enforced." Id. at 172 (quoting Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,
700 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
29 Act To Prevent Pollution of Ships, 33 U.S.C. § 1910; Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7604;
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365; Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 9659; Emergency Planning and
Community Right-to-Know Act of 1986, § 326(a)(1); Endangered Species Act of 1973,
16 U.S.C. § 1540(g); Noise Control Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. § 4911; Public Lands Act, 43
U.S.C. § 1349(a); Resources Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6972; Safe
Drinking Water Act, § 300J- 8; Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, 30
155
Mo. ENvTL. L. & POL'Y REv., Vol. 14, No. I
important role in compelling the government to comply with
nondiscretionary duties and enforcing permits and regulations against
polluters, that the Federal Insecticide & Fungicide Rodenticide Act is the
lone major environmental statute lacking a citizen suit provision.3 o The
idea that a citizen has the right to bring a suit against environmental
transgressors is in no way an anomaly. It has developed over six plus
centuries of Anglo-American jurisprudence, and is statutorily adopted in
nearly all modern federal environmental regulations.3 '
C. Modern State Citizen Suit Provisions
Since the early 1970's many states have enacted citizen suit
mechanisms similar to those in federal environmental laws.3 2 The several
states that have enacted citizen suits create standing to sue for
environmental violations allowing citizens to act as private attorneys
general, thereby relieving some of the regulatory burden of the state. 33
1. Michigan Environmental Protection Act of 1970
The first, and arguably most important,34 state citizen suit
provision is commonly known as the "Sax Act," after its principle
visionary and drafter, Professor Joseph Sax.35 This Act, the Michigan
U.S.C. § 1270; and Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2619. See Daniel Riesel,
Citizen Suits and the Award ofAttorneys'Fees in Environmental Litigation, C921 ALI-
ABA 1073, 1079 (1994). Riesel briefly outlines the major provisions of Federal
Environmental Statutes.
30 FIFRA, 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y. See Riesel, supra note 29, at 1079.
31 See supra note 29, and see generally Part I for a discussion on the evolution of
environmental citizen suits.
32 George et al., supra note 9. George looks at all the states and the general components
of their environmental laws. In the Appendices of his article, George surveys the
existence of environmental citizen suit provisions. Id.
33 id. at 14.
34 Professor Joseph Sax is credited with promoting and being the force behind the passage
of the Michigan Act. This act was the first in a line of statutes that the federal and state
governments passed allowing citizens to bring legal claims without being required to
show standing arising out of standard nuisance law.
3s George et al., supra note 9, at 15.
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Environmental Protection Act of 1970 ("MEPA"),36 contains broad
standing provisions which provide citizens the right to sue. 37
The Michigan Environmental Protection Act allows citizens to sue
to protect Michigan's natural resources whether or not a law has been
broken.38 Professor Sax thought it essential that citizens have access to the
courts before environmental harm occurs.39 The Michigan legislature
enacted this essential piece, making the standing requirement a minimal
hurdle in the MEPA.40 Section 324.1701(1) states:
The attorney general or any person may maintain an action
for declaratory and equitable relief against any person for
the protection of air, water, and other natural resources and
the public trust in these resources from pollution,
impairment, or destruction.41
By allowing citizens to sue without a violation of state law, Michigan's
Supreme Court found that this Act "imposes a duty on individuals and
organizations both in the public and private sectors to prevent or minimize
degradation of the environment which is caused or is likely to be caused
by their activities.'A2
36 See MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 324.1701-.1706 (West 2005).
37 Id. at 324.1701(1).
The attorney general or any person may maintain an action in the
circuit court having jurisdiction where the alleged violation occurred or
is likely to occur for declaratory and equitable relief against any person
for the protection of the air, water, and other natural resources and the
public trust in these resources from pollution, impairment, or
destruction.
Id. (emphasis added).
38 George et al., supra note 9, at 15. See also Robert H. Abrams, Thresholds ofHarm in
Environmental Litigation: The Michigan Environmental Act as Model of a Minimal
Requirement, 7 HARV.ENVTL. L. REv. 107, 112 (1983).
3 See SAX, supra note 6, at Ch. 1.
40 George et al., supra note 9, at 15.
41 MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §§ 324.1701(1) (West 2005).
42 Ray v. Mason County Drain Comm'r, 224 N.W.2d 883, 888 (Mich. 1975). The Court
develops a process to analyze claims brought under the MEPA and the first step is
determining if "the plaintiff has established a P[r]ima facie case that the defendant's
conduct 'has or is likely to pollute, impair or destroy the air, water, or other natural
157
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With the broad grant of standing under MEPA, citizens who bring
a claim have an opportunity to involve the legal system before damage has
been done, just as Professor Sax envisioned. Professor Sax identified the
environmental lawsuit as most effectively employed as a preventive
measure.4 3 Prior to this Michigan citizen suit provision, Sax observed that
citizens were unable to access the courts to seek relief on behalf of public
environmental rights.4 Sax also observed that the interests which create
most of the negative environmental effects have very good access to
policy makers, whereas those who oppose the negative effects of those
interests have very limited access.45 It makes sense in a political climate in
which enforcement actions by the government are declining, penalties are
falling, and the EPA itself has expressed concerns about diminishing
inspections and criminal referrals, to create the necessary access to
encourage citizens to bring actions protecting environmental values.46
2. Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of 1971
In enacting the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act of
197147 ("CEPA"), Connecticut's legislature, like Michigan's, provided the
citizens with a legal voice for the protection of the state's natural
resources. 48 CEPA expanded "the number of potential guardians of the
resources . . .' or how he has failed to." Id. at 889. This showing is all that is needed to
put the burden on the defendant to show the opposite. See generally George et al., supra
note 9, at 15-16.
43 SAx, supra note 6, at 121.
4Id. at 122.
45 See id. at Ch 1. Sax recounts a fact scenario where the politically well connected had
the resources to bide their time and be patient with their "investment" until the opposing
forces exhausted their own resources. The story Professor Sax tells generates a vision of
cigar-smoke-laden backroom dealings, between the politically powerful in Washington
D.C.
46 See James R. May, Now More Than Ever: Trends in Environmental Citizen Suits At
30, 10 WIDENER L. REv. 1, 5 (2003) [hereinafter May Trends]. May includes specific
percentages and trends of declining enforcement. Id.
47 See CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-14 to 22a-20 (2006).
48 Conn. Coal. Against Millstone v. Rocque, 267 Conn. 116, 129 (Conn, 2003).
Traditionally, citizens seeking to protect the environment were required
to show specific, personal aggrievement to attain standing to bring a
legal action . . . . The Connecticut Environmental Protection Act;
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public interest in the environment into the millions, instead of relying
exclusively on the limited resources of a particular agency."4 9 This
expansion "provid[ed] all persons with an adequate remedy to protect the
air, water or other natural resources from unreasonable pollution,
impairment or destruction."50 The Connecticut courts have interpreted the
term "natural resources" broadly.5  This broad reading of "natural
resources" was in part guided by Minnesota's statutorily defined use of
"natural resources." 52 Where there is an action that could negatively affect
"natural resources," Connecticut courts require that alternatives to such
actions be considered.53
3. Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
In 1971 Minnesota joined the growing movement seeking to
increase access for citizens to sue as private attorneys general for
environmental wrongs. 54 The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act
General Statutes § 22a-1 et seq.; however, waives the aggrievement
requirement in two circumstances. First, any private party, including a
municipality, without first having to establish aggrievement, may seek
injunctive relief in court for the protection of the public trust in the air,
water and other natural resources of the state from unreasonable
pollution, impairment or destruction . . . . Second, any person or other
entity, without first having to establish aggrievement, may intervene in
any administrative proceeding challenging conduct which has, or which
is reasonably likely to have, the effect of unreasonably polluting,
impairing or destroying the public trust in the air, water or other natural
resources of the state.
Id. (quoting CONN. GEN. STAT. §§ 22a-1,16,19(a)) (citations omitted).
49 Greenwich v. Conn. Transp. Auth., 166 Conn. 337, 343 (Conn. 1974).
50 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-15.
s1 Jennifer E. Sills, The Connecticut Environmental Protection Act ("CEPA"): Enabling
Citizens to Speak For the Environment, 70 CONN. B.J. 353, 357-359 (1996). Sills
recounts the process Connecticut followed in arriving at the conclusion that the term
'natural resources' is not limited to that which has economic value, but includes a broad
range of organisms within its meaning. See Red Hill Coal., Inc. v. Town Plan & Zoning
Comm'n, 563 A.2d 1339 (Conn. 1989).
52 Sills, supra note 51, at 358.
s3 Id. at 357-59.
54 See MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 116B.01-.13 (West 2005).
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("MERA") followed the wise observations of Professor Sax55 and
statutorily guaranteed the essential role that citizens and courts play in
protecting the natural environment. 56
Minnesota's courts have interpreted the language to of MERA to
allow "any person" to bring an action for the protection of "any natural
resource" from "any conduct" that "has, or is likely to cause pollution,
impairment, or destruction of the air, water, land, or other natural resource
located within the state."57 MERA requires a balancing of ecological
concerns against technological considerations, which allows the defendant
in the suit to rebut a prime facie case by showing that there is "no feasible
or prudent alternative or the conduct is in the best interest of the public."58
5 See generally SAx, supra note 6.5 6 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 subdiv. 1.
Any person residing within the state; the attorney general; any political
subdivision of the state; any instrumentality or agency of the state or of
a political subdivision thereof; or any partnership, corporation,
association, organization, or other entity having shareholders, members,
partners or employees residing within the state may maintain a civil
action in the district court for declaratory or equitable relief in the name
of the state of Minnesota against any person, for the protection of the
air, water, land, or other natural resources located within the state,
whether publicly or privately owned, from pollution, impairment, or
destruction; provided, however, that no action shall be allowable
hereunder for acts taken by a person on land leased or owned by said
person pursuant to a permit or license issued by the owner of the land
to said person which do not and can not reasonably be expected to
pollute, impair, or destroy any other air, water, land, or other natural
resources located within the state; provided further that no action shall
be allowable under this section for conduct taken by a person pursuant
to any environmental quality standard, limitation, rule, order, license,
stipulation agreement or permit issued by the Pollution Control
Agency, Department of Natural Resources, Department of Health or
Department of Agriculture.
Id.
5 County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 297 (1973).
" Id. at 297-98. Evidence of alternatives that were considered, when offered as an
affirmative defense, may rebut the prime facie case presented by the plaintiff. Id. at 298.
The defendant may show that "there is [n]o feasible and prudent alternative and the
conduct at issue is [c]onsistent with and reasonably required for the promotion of the
public health, [s]afety, and welfare, in light of the state's paramount concern for the
protection of its air, water, land, and other natural resources from pollution, impairment,
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Prior to MERA's enactment, Minnesotans had a difficult time
getting into court to protect the state's natural resources due to procedural
and substantive barriers. 59 Due to the need to show direct damage or
injury, plaintiffs were often unable to achieve standing necessary to bring
a common-law nuisance claim.60 The inability of the citizen plaintiff to
show that the defendant/polluter's actions has caused or would cause
plaintiff direct injury or damage61 resulted in citizens having little or no
ability to utilize the court system for benefit of the environment.62 The
effectiveness of these common-law nuisance suits was further limited by
governmental immunity statutes, 63 and by the determination that
defendants had acquired a prescriptive easement to pollute." Such barriers
limited citizens' most effective means (access to the courts) to participate
directly in the resolution of environmental problems.65
MERA was adopted in a time of environmental experimentation
attempting solutions to remedy dangers that Rachel Carson's Silent Spring
predicted.66 It was groundbreaking in the broad grant of standing it
created, but it did not provide the legislature's intended "adequate civil
remedy."67 The Minnesota Supreme Court concluded that MERA
or destruction. Economic considerations alone shall not constitute a defense hereunder."
Id (quoting MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.04).
59 Andrew J. Piela, A Tale of Two Statutes: Twenty Year Judicial Interpretation of the
Citizen Suit Provision in the Connecticut Environmental Protection Act and the
Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, 21 B.C. ENvTL. AFF. L. REv. 401, 402-403, 403
n.14 (1994).
6 Id. at 402-403.
61 See Herman v. Larson, 7 N.W.2d 330, 333 (Minn. 1943). Bringing a common law
nuisance claim requires such a showing for standing. Id.
62 Piela, supra note 59.
63 See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 540.13 (West 1987).
6 See Herman, 7 N.W.2d at 333.
65 See SAX, supra note 6, at xii.
6 See RACHEL CARSON, Silent Spring (Fawcett World Library 1962). Carson cites
numerous examples of ecological destruction including the effects of DDT on bird
populations, toxic rivers killing off fish over vast distances, the increase in human
leukemia's associated with known toxic substances, and the prediction of ecosystem
collapse if these practices continue.
67 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01 (West 2005).
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"expresses a paramount concern for the preservation of natural resources,"
which means that this concern is "superior to all other[s]."
The courts have interpreted standing broadly due to the exhaustive
list of definitions contained within the statute for the term "person." 69 The
legislature also wisely contained an extensive, but non-exclusive list, of
natural resources that are available for protection under MERA. 70 Also
included within the definitions section of MERA is restatement of what
pollution, impairment, or destruction includes. 7  This definition is
essential as it grants standing for pollution that is likely to occur.72 The
68 Floodwood-Fine Lakes Citizens Group v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 287 N.W.2d
390, 399 (Minn.1979).69 Mf. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02 subdiv. 2. Person:
"Person" means any natural person, any state, municipality or other
governmental or political subdivision or other public agency or
instrumentality, any public or private corporation, any partnership,
firm, association, or other organization, any receiver, trustee, assignee,
agent, or other legal representative of any of the foregoing, and any
other entity, except a family farm, a family farm corporation or a bona
fide farmer corporation.
Id. See County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290, 294-95 (1973).
70 MM. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02 subdiv. 4. Natural resources:
"Natural resources" shall include, but not be limited to, all mineral,
animal, botanical, air, water, land, timber, soil, quietude, recreational
and historical resources. Scenic and esthetic resources shall also be
considered natural resources when owned by any governmental unit or
agency.
Id.
71 Id. at subdiv. 5. Pollution, impairment or destruction:
"Pollution, impairment or destruction" is any conduct by any person
which violates, or is likely to violate, any environmental quality
standard, limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or
permit of the state or any instrumentality, agency, or political
subdivision thereof which was issued prior to the date the alleged
violation occurred or is likely to occur or any conduct which materially
adversely affects or is likely to materially adversely affect the
environment; provided that "pollution, impairment or destruction" shall
not include conduct which violates, or is likely to violate, any such
standard, limitation, rules, order, license, stipulation agreement or
permit solely because of the introduction of an odor into the air.
Id.72 id.
162
MINNESOTA ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS ACT & ATTORNEY'S FEES
term "likely" allows for a civil action before the environmental harm has
occurred, thus fulfilling one of Professor Sax's prerequisites for an
effective environmental citizen suit statute."
The Minnesota Supreme Court interpreted MERA to allow for
"any person" 74 to bring suit to protect and preserve the state's natural
resources.75 This is right is not taken lightly by Minnesota's highest court
as they see citizen vigilance as essential for the protection of the state's
environmental resources.76
Under MERA a successful plaintiff is entitled to declaratory relief,
or temporary or permanent equitable relief.77 Typically, successful
plaintiffs under MERA have been granted injunctive relief.78
7 See generally SAX, supra note 6, at Ch. 1.
74 Freeborn, 210 N.W.2d at 294-95.
7s Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762,
781 (Minn. 1977). "The Minnesota Environmental Rights Act, ... a far-reaching
legislative enactment, has created, in effect, a right in each person to the preservation and
protection of natural resources within the state and has provided a legal remedy for the
effectuation of those rights." Id
76 People for Envtl. Enlightenment & Responsibility v. Minn. Envtl. Quality Council, 266
N.W.2d 858, 866 (Minn. 1978). MERA "was seen by the legislature as an important
mechanism which could be used by citizens to force an administrative agency to protect
the state's natural resources." Id. at 866 n.6.
" MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1 16B.07 (West 2005). Relief:
The court may grant declaratory relief, temporary and permanent
equitable relief, or may impose such conditions upon a party as are
necessary or appropriate to protect the air, water, land or other natural
resources located within the state from pollution, impairment, or
destruction. When the court grants temporary equitable relief, it may
require the plaintiff to post a bond sufficient to indemnify the defendant
for damages suffered because of the temporary relief, if permanent
relief is not granted.
Id.
78 See Piela, supra note 59, at 423. Piela lists a string of cases that ended in injunctive
relief: Krmpotich v. City of Duluth, 474 N.W.2d 392, 400-01 (Minn. 1991); Minn. Pub.
Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d 762, 783 (Minn.
1977); County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 243 N.W.2d 316, 321-22 (Minn. 1976).
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II. FEE SHIFTING: ATTORNEYS' FEES PROVISIONS
What would happen if the Lorax not only had standing, but
could also recover the cost he expended on protecting the
Humming Fish from the glupitty-glup?
Many environmental statutes accomplish two important actions;
first, as discussed above, they create standing requirements that are much
more attainable than the alternative common law nuisance claim; and
second, they even the playing field between interests that profit from
environmental degradation and interests that seek to protect natural
resources by allowing for the recovery of attorney fees and costs.
A. History of Fee Shifting
The roots of environmental citizen suits can be traced back to
Richard II;79 his predecessor, Edward III, took the next step in advancing
the power of those suits by enacting an early fee-shifting provision in
1331.o This 1331 law awarded the individual bringing a citizen suit for
their effort by allocating a share of the damages assessed against the
transgressor to the individual bringing the suit.8' By the eighteenth
century, England created an "informers action" whereby the "parties
assisting in the apprehension and conviction of violators would share in
the fines collected as a result" of the action.82 The bringer of the suit was
also allowed to recover a share of fines imposed as a result of the citizen
suit.83 "Informers actions" created a financial incentive for citizens to
9 See supra Part 1(A).
80 Statute made at Westminster In the Fifth Year of the Reign of K. Edward the Third
After the Conquest, 5 Edw. III, ch. 5 (1331). See Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 8, at
947.
81 Id. A 1331 statute, for example, allocated one-fourth of any fines imposed on
stallholders selling goods after the close of a fair to "every Man that will sue for our Lord
the King." Id.
82 George et al., supra note 9, at 10. See also Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 8, at 952.
The "informers action" was created in England at the start of the industrial revolution to
combat what was seen as an "epidemic of crime." Id.83 Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 8, at 952.
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privately prosecute violations of the law on the theory that it would lesson
the burden on the government as it fought the growing crime epidemic in
England.84 These actions were eventually abolished due to the problems
inherent in enforcing them.85
The so-called "English Rule" of fee shifting has evolved to become
a "loser pays" rule where the successful party may collect legal fees or
costs from the loser.86 This loser pays rule is a two-way fee shifting
regime where the loser, whether plaintiff or defendant, pays the winner's
attorney fees.87
Another system of fee-shifting known as "one-way fee shifting," is
a method where fees are shifted only in favor of one party.88 Under this
regime only the winning plaintiff would benefit and recover fees from the
losing defendant.89 The one-way fee shifting system has been incorporated
in some American environmental statutes to encourage plaintiffs to file
claims that benefit the public. 90
B. The American Rule
While the American legal system inherited much of England's
jurisprudence, including citizen suit provisions, the loser pays theory did
not complete the trans-Atlantic crossing. Instead, in the United States the
84 Id. The theory is straightforward; pay private citizens to enforce the law on their
fellow citizens, because the crown does not have the resources to adequately enforce its
own laws. Id.
85 Id. at 954. Informer's actions and private enforcement became so widespread and
available for such diverse regulations as the English legal system sought to increase the
cost of crime by making private prosecution lucrative. There were several problems with
the system including an overt class bias which encouraged the wealth class to act as
regulators of the lower classes. The crimes that the upper classes enforced with vigor
were largely petty offences and eventually disrespect grew for the laws and contempt
grew for the enforcers. Enforcers were no longer looked on as legitimate and the system
eroded. Id.
86 W. Kent Davis, The International View ofAttorney Fees in Civil Suits: Why is the
United States The "Odd Man Out" in How it Pays its Lawyers?, 16 Aluz. J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 361, 403 (1999).87 Id.88 Id.
89 
idn90See infra Part U1(P.
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traditional rule on attorney's fees is known as the "American Rule," which
holds that each party must bear its own legal expense. 9 1 In the United
States express statutory authorization must exist for the court to depart
from the traditional rule and allow fee shifting. 92 While the general rule in
the United States is that the prevailing party is prohibited from recovering
fees, there is a substantial body of statutory exceptions to the rule.93 The
American Rule is frequently disregarded to promote public interest
litigation where Congress has "opted to rely heavily on private
enforcement to implement public policy." 94
In the United States the default method for calculation of
attorney's fees is known as the "Lodestar Method." 95 The mechanics of
the method are simple: "the value of the attorney's work on a case is
measured by (1) the number of hours reasonably expended on the
litigation, multiplied by (2) a reasonable hourly rate."96
C. Federal Environmental Citizen Suits With Attorneys'Fees Provisions
Not only has the federal government granted citizens standing to
sue for violations of environmental statutes and waived sovereign
immunity of its own liability for environmental transgressions, it has also
incorporated fee shifting provisions, thus creating an incentive, or at least
91 Sisk Primer, supra note 13, at 738.92 Id. at 738-39. There are limited common law exceptions to the American Rule, but
because of their limited application generally, and their nonexistence in the scope of
environmental citizen suit provisions they will not be discussed here.
9 John F. Vargo, The American Rule on Attorney Fee Allocation: The Injured Person's
Access to Justice, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 1567, 1588 (1993). Vargo's research found "over
200 federal statutes and almost 2000 state statutes that provide for the shifting of
attorney's fees." Id.
94 Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 263 (1975). "It is true
that under some, if not most, of the statutes providing for the allowance of reasonable
fees, Congress has opted to rely heavily on private enforcement to implement public
policy and to allow counsel fees so as to encourage private litigation. Fee shifting in
connection with treble-damages awards under the antitrust laws is a prime example. . .
Id.
95 See Sisk Primer, supra note 13, at 747-48 (discussing Lindy Bros. Builders Inc. v. Am.
Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 540 F.2d 102 (3d Cir. 1976) (en banc)).96Id. at 748.
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leveling the playing field, for attorneys to take cases that are in the public
interest and may not otherwise be economically feasible.97
There is nothing unusual about the recovery of attorney's fees in
federal environmental citizen suits.98 It was well known in the 1970's that
federal enforcement mechanisms were lacking in efficacy, so Congress
created the citizen suit provision to bolster enforcement. 99 In recognizing
citizens' invaluable role in enforcing environmental regulations, Congress
removed the financial barriers to that assistance by allowing courts to
award reasonable attorney's fees whenever "appropriate."1oo This
provision for funding devices was intended to close the resource gap
between industry and public interest. 0' In Sierra Club v. Gorsuch,'02 the
D.C. Circuit stated the purpose of the attorney's fees provision in the
Clean Air Actl03 is "to encourage the participation of 'public interest'
groups in resolving complex technical questions and important and
difficult questions of statutory interpretation, and in monitoring and
implementing the Act."'" The Supreme Court has found that under the
Clean Air Act a party need not prevail on the "central issue,"105 but need
only succeed on "any significant issue in [the] litigation which achieves
some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing the suit."' 06
The Senate, in enacting section 304(d) of the Clean Air Act, stated:
97 GREGORY C. SISK, LITIGATION WITH THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT: CASES AND
MATERIALS 809-10 (Foundation Press 2000) [hereinafter SISK CASEBOOK].
98 See Sisk Primer, supra note 13, at 777-78.
99 Walter B. Russell, III & Paul Thomas Gregory, Awards ofAttorney's Fees in
Environmental Litigation: Citizen Suits and the "Appropriate" Standard, 18 GA. L. REV.
307, 308-09 (1984).
'
00 Id. at 309.
101 Boyer & Meidinger, supra note 8, at 843-844. In the agency rulemaking process there
is an imbalance between the resources industry can muster as opposed to the "other
interests." The fee shifting provisions are an attempt to mitigate this imbalance. Id.
102 672 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.1982), rev'd, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
103 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f) states: "In any judicial proceeding under this section, the court
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees)
whenever it determines such award is appropriate."
104 Gorsuch, 672 F.2d at 38. See also Russell & Gregory, supra note 99, at 343.
105 Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983). See Sisk Primer, supra note 13, at
780-81.
106 Tex. State Teachers Ass'n v. Garland Indep. Sch. Dist., 489 U.S. 782, 789 (1989). See
Sisk Primer, supra note 13, at 780-81.
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Concern was expressed that some lawyers would use
section 304 to bring frivolous and harassing actions. The
committee has added a key element in providing that the
courts may award costs of litigation, including reasonable
attorney and expert witness fees, whenever the court
determines that such action is in the public interest. The
court could thus award costs of litigation to defendants
where the litigation was obviously frivolous or harassing.
This should have the effect of discouraging abuse of this
provision, while at the same time encouraging the quality
of the actions brought. The courts should recognize that in
bringing legitimate actions under this section, citizens
would be performing a public service and in such instances
the courts should award costs of litigation to such party.
This should extend to plaintiffs in actions that result in
successful abatement but do not reach a verdict. For
instance, if as a result of a citizen proceeding and before a
verdict is issued, a defendant abated a violation, the court
may award litigation expenses borne by the plaintiffs in
prosecuting such action.10 7
Like the Clean Water Act there are about a dozen federal citizen
suits that allow awards for litigation costs including reasonable attorney
and expert witness fees to any party, whenever the court determines such
award is appropriate. 08 This provision has been tested and interpreted in
107 S. Rep. MO 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 56, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5374,
5388. See Russell & Gregory, supra note 99, at 327-30, for further discussion of the
Senate hearings.
1o8 Clean Air Act § 304(d) states: "The court, in issuing any final order in any action
brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may award costs of litigation (including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines
such award is appropriate." Id. There is similar language in 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2000).
The following environmental statutes allow attorney's fees to be granted when the court
deems such an award "appropriate": Toxic Substances Control Act §§ 19(d), 20(c)(2), 15
U.S.C. §§ 2618(d), 2619(c)(2); Endangered Species Act of 1973, § 11 (g)(4), 16 U.S.C. §
1540(g)(4); Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, § 520(d), 30 U.S.C. §
1270(d); Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act § 117(c), 30 U.S.C. § 1427(c);
Marine Protection, Research, and Sanctuaries Act of 1972, § 105(g)(4), 33 U.S.C. §
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the federal courts since the 1970's, and has acted as an incentive for the
citizenry to bring environmental suits that serve the public interest. 109
D. State Environmental Citizen Suits With Attorneys'Fees Provisions
When professor Sax proposed his plan to open access to the courts
for citizens to sue for environmental wrongs, he was attempting to level
the field between interests adverse to the conservation and protection of
natural resources and interests that endeavor to protect those resources."l0
In order to achieve balance Sax knew that access to the courts was not
enough; he knew that it was necessary to allow for the possibility of cost
recovery.
While it is now somewhat routine for fee shifting provisions to be
included in federal environmental statutes,'l 2 relatively few statesll 3 have
fully employed their citizenry to fill in for the inadequate enforcement of
environmental regulations due to budgetary constraints. 114 Minnesota is
one of the states that imprudently lacks provision for an award of
attorney's fees and costs in environmental citizen suits.
1415(g)(4); Deepwater Port Act of 1974, § 16(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1515(d); Safe Drinking
Water Act § 1449(d), 42 U.S.C. § 300j-8(d); Noise Control Act of 1972, § 12(d), 42
U.S.C. § 4911(d); Energy Policy and Conservation Act § 335(d), 42 U.S.C. § 6305(d);
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976, § 7002(e), 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e);
Powerplant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978, § 725, 42 U.S.C. § 8435(d); Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act Amendments of 1978, § 23(a)(5), 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(5).
See Russell & Gregory, supra note 99, at n.9 for a list of statutes that employ the term
"appropriate."
1 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 99, at n.9 1. Russell found no empirical evidence
that the "appropriate" standard encourages public interest groups to litigate these types of
suits, but common sense suggests that potential fees recovery can serve as a powerful
incentive for public interest groups with limited resources.
110 See SAX, supra note 6, at Ch. 1.
SId
112 SISK CASEBOOK, supra note 97.
113 See generally George et al., supra note 9 for which states have environmental citizen
suit provisions that include allowance for fee shifting and costs.
114 Lehner, supra note 25, at 4.
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1. Michigan
The possibility of cost recovery for a "prevailing or substantially
prevailing party" is not so much an incentive to bring a suit as it is a risk-
reducing factor in weighing whether or not to bring a suit to prevent a
deleterious action.'1 This concept was incorporated into MEPA" R and has
been interpreted as providing for costs "if the interests of justice
require."" 7Where such suits are brought, it is within the court's discretion
to award costs. As the presiding Judge in Model Laundries states:
Public policy favors an award of attorney fees to the
prevailing or substantially prevailing party in
environmental suits brought by Citizens. It was in the
interest of cleaning up the environment as quickly as
possible that the Legislature provided the vehicle for
individuals to initiate litigation without awaiting
government action. The attorney fees provision of MERA
serves an important purpose. It enables individuals,
otherwise without the necessary financial means, to initiate
and carry to completion a complex environmental action."
The possibility of cost recovery for a "prevailing or substantially
prevailing party" is not so much an incentive to bring a suit, as it is a risk-
reducing factor in weighing whether or not to bring a suit to prevent a
11' George et al., supra note 9, at 15.
116 See supra Part 1 (C)(a) for a description of MEPA. "In issuing a final order in an
action brought pursuant to this section, the court may award costs of litigation, including
reasonable attorney and expert witness fees to the prevailing or substantially prevailing
party if the court determines that an award is appropriate." MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §
324.20135(5) (West 2005).
117 Three Lakes Ass'n v. Kessler, 300 N.W.2d 485, 488-489 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
"Certain portions of this action were brought under MEPA." Id. at 488. "Section 3(3) of
that act provides that costs, including attorney fees, may be awarded if the interests of
justice require." Id. at 488-89. "We agree with the argument that [the section] is a
statutory exception. . . ." Id. at 489.
118 Model Laundries & Dry Cleaners v. Amoco Corp., 548 N.W.2d 242, 245 (Mich. Ct.
App. 1996.) (Kelly, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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deleterious action.119 The allowance of a citizen suit with the possibility of
cost recovery levels the playing field in Michigan by allowing the
concerned parties access to the courts, and in some cases making it "worth
it" to go to court.
2. Connecticut
The Connecticut statute, like the Michigan statute, takes an
important step beyond Minnesota's Environmental Rights Act by adopting
a provision whereby the court may grant costs and attorney fees to the
party that maintains the action under CEPA.120 The Connecticut
legislature, in adopting this explicit and general waiver of the American
Rule for attorney's fees, evinced the state's desire to abide by Professor
Sax's goal of empowering the citizenry to be a check on the environmental
well being of their state.
Connecticut courts abide by the idea that standing is expressly
conferred to "any person" that brings a claim to "restrain a continuing
violation of' specific environmental regulations and statutes.' 21 When an
individual has standing under CEPA and the person maintaining the action
under the statute obtains declaratory or equitable relief against the
defendant, the court may award costs, "including reasonable costs for
witnesses, and a reasonable attorney's fee."l 22
119 George et al., supra note 9, at 15.
120 CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-18(e) (2006).
The court may award any person, partnership, corporation, association,
organization or other legal entity which maintains an action under section 22a-
16 or intervenes as a party in an action for judicial review under section 22a-19,
and obtains declaratory or equitable relief against the defendant, its costs,
including reasonable costs for witnesses, and a reasonable attorney's fee.
Id.
121 Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC., 2002 WL 31255536 at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct.
2002) (interpreting CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a).122 Id. See also CONN. GEN. STAT. § 22a-18(e).
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3. Minnesota
Following the observations of Professor Sax regarding the essential
role that both citizens and courts play in protecting the natural
environment, federal and state governments around the country took on
the task of creating statutes to effectuate citizen interaction. Minnesota
began the process with two competing bills proposed early in 1971.123
These bills, S.F. 471 and S.F. 418, were early versions of what became
known as the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act.124 They were modeled
after the Michigan Environmental Protection Act 25 and were clearly
intended to involve citizens in furtherance of the goal of protecting natural
resources.126
In effectuating this goal, Professor Sax introduced the idea of the
Citizen Suit as a preventative measure, as a way to level the playing field
between interests that "benefit"' 27 from environmental degradation and the
123 Minn. Leg. S. Committee Record, at 6-7 (1971) (on file at Minn. Hist. Soc'y.).
124 Both bills allow for citation as the "Minnesota Environmental Rights Act." S.F. 471 §
14 (SAM 279) and S.F. 418 (1971 Journal).
125 See supra Part 1(C)(a) for a description and history of MEPA.
126 Section 1 of S.F. 471, S.F. 418 provides:
The Legislature recognizes the interdependence of all components of
the natural environment and that the life support system of the earth has
finite limits, and recognizes further that inherent in these principles is
the right of each person to the protection, preservation and
enhancement of air, water, land and other natural resources locate
within the state and that each person has the responsibility to contribute
to the protection, preservation and enhancement thereof. Therefore the
legislature declares that its continuing policy is to create and maintain
within the state those conditions under which man and nature can exist
in productive harmony to insure the maximum potentiality of diversity,
vitality and fertility of the air, water, land, and other natural resources
with which the state has been endowed. Accordingly, it is in the public
interest to provide adequate civil remedies to protect the air, water, land
and other natural resources located within the state from pollution,
impairment or destruction.
Id. (emphasis added). See also SAX, supra note 6, at 120-21.
127 Author's note: Economically the benefit from environmental degradation operates
only in the very short term; there is arguably no way to benefit in the long term and
practice operations that destroy the environment.
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interests of preservation.128 While the proposed Minnesota bills slightly
differed from the Michigan statute, judging from the timing of their
introduction (immediately after the Michigan statute's adoption) and their
general similarity to the MEPA, the Minnesota Legislature likely intended
the same effect as Professor Sax suggested.129 In Michigan these desired
effects (expanded citizen access to the courts and a more leveled playing
field) were achieved by liberalizing standing requirements beyond the
common law nuisance showing, and by allowing the plaintiff to recover
reasonable attorney fees and costs.' 30
S.F. 471 included the grant of standing and attorney's fees and
costs provisions when both it and S.F. 418 were re-referred out of the
Natural Resources and Environment committee to the Committee on Civil
Administration, but only S.F. 418 left the Civil Administration
committee.' 31 S.F. 418 did not contain the attorney's fees portion of the
formula that would result in an effective empowerment of the citizenry to
address environmental degradation.132 While it is unclear what happened
to S.F. 471 or the attorney fees provision, it is clear that between the
Natural Resource and Environment Committee and the Committee on
Civil Administration the Senate inserted portions of S.F. 471 into S.F. 418
without including the fees provision. 133 Once a single bill was decided on,
it enjoyed enormous support from the senate, passing unanimously out of
each committee it was sent to' 34 and then it was adopted unanimously.' 35
S.F. 418 became the Minnesota Environmental Rights Act and was
considered novel with respect to its broad definition of what resources
128 SAX, supra note 6, at 122.
129 The Minnesota bills have expanded standing allowances, as well as extensive
definitions of what "natural resources" are. See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1 16B.02 (West
2005) (definitions).
130 See SAX, supra note 6. See also supra Part 2(D)(a).
131 On May 21, 1971 S.F. 418 was unanimously passed out of the Committee on Civil
Administration and referred to Conference Committee. Journal of the Senate, 1971 vol.
2.
132 d
133 S.F. 418 was reprinted in the Journal of the Senate vol. 2., p.2 6 3 6 with provisions
adapted from S.F. 471, such as the definitions of natural resources section.
134 See Journal of the Senate, pp. 2636, 3464.
135 1971 Minn. Laws c.952, s.3; S.F. No 418.
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were to be included within the scope of its protection.136 Loss of the
essential attorney's fees provision however, destined it to fall short of its
legislative purpose.'
III. MERA: ONE LEG SHORT OF A BALANCED STOOL
Federal environmental citizen suit provisions that allow for the
recovery of attorney's fees are like a stable three legged stool: the first leg
is the resource to be protected, the second leg is grant of standing for a
citizen to sue to protect that resource, and the third leg is access that is
afforded to citizens by the opportunity to recover the costs of their efforts
to protect the nation's resources.
A. Citizen Use of MERA
Minnesota enacted the MERA shortly after Michigan's
enactment of its groundbreaking citizen suit statute with the purpose of
empowering the citizenry to protect the state's natural resources. 38
Unfortunately, the legislature enacted MERA as a two-legged stool unable
to accomplish its poetically drafted purpose.' 39
136 Lehner, supra note 25, at 10.
137 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1 16B.01 (West 2005) states:
[T]hat present and future generations may enjoy clean air, and water,
productive land, and other natural resources with which this state has
been endowed. Accordingly, it is in the public interest to provide an
adequate civil remedy to protect air, water, land and other natural
resources located within the state from pollution, impairment, or
destruction.
(emphasis added).
138 See id. See also section 1 of S.F. 471 (1971) and S.F. 418 (1971).3 9 Purpose:
The legislature finds and declares that each person is entitled by right to
the protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land, and
other natural resources located within the state and that each person has
the responsibility to contribute to the protection, preservation, and
enhancement thereof. The legislature further declares its policy to
create and maintain within the state conditions under which human
beings and nature can exist in productive harmony in order that present
and future generations may enjoy clean air and water, productive land,
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MERA has been effectively utilized is as a defensive suit where
there is a direct personal interest at stake.140 Not long after MERA was
enacted the Bryson case set the tone for how the act would be used in the
coming decades.141 The Brysons owned land that contained a natural
wetland, and the county sought to condemn the wetland to build a county
road.142 Because Bryson was directly affected, both financially and
physically, by the state action, he found it necessary to avail himself of the
courts regardless of the cost. While the Brysons were successful in
protecting the natural resource on their property under MERA, 143 they
sued to protect property from condemnation that they had a direct
financial interest in. However, use as a defensive-shield-of-last-resort was
not the only way Minnesota's legislature intended MERA to be used.'"
Instead, the legislature intended that any Minnesotan use the statute where
a natural resource needs protection, not just where a citizen has a financial
interest in protecting such a resource. 145
With the broad grant of standing to citizens and the broad scope of
included natural resources, MERA's two legs allowed access to the
courts.146 Citizens and citizen groups have been successful under
MERA,14 7 but success has been difficult to come by considering that the
Minnesota Attorney's General Office has record of only 9 suits being
brought (not necessarily successfully) under MERA since 1997.148 The
and other natural resources with which this state has been endowed.
Accordingly, it is in the public interest to provide an adequate civil
remedy to protect air, water, land and other natural resources located
within the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01.
140 County of Freeborn v. Bryson, 210 N.W.2d 290 (1973).
141 id
142 Id. at 293.
143 Id. at 298.
144 See MiNN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01.
145 id.
146 See Freeborn, 210 N.W.2d 290; Krmpotich v. City of Duluth, 474 N.W.2d 392 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1991).
147 See id.
148 According to Andy Tourville of the Attorney's General Office, as of 12/07/05 there is
record (by statute [MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 subdiv. 2] the initiator of the suit must
notify the AG's Office) of 9 MERA claims being initiated since 1997 and 1 currently
being contemplated. Mr. Tourville thinks that this number seems low, and posited that
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question becomes, with so few claims does MERA meet its stated purpose
"to provide an adequate civil remedy" 49 to protect the natural resources of
the state?
There are several possibilities for the lack of MERA claims: 1) the
statute does provide for "adequate civil remedies," but there is no need for
claims as degradation of Minnesota's resources have all but ceased, 2)
other statutes are adequately protecting Minnesota's resources, 3) citizens
lack the desire to bring such suits, or 4) the MERA statute is deficient in
its accessibility.
B. Minnesota's Wetland Loss as Measure of MiERA Efficacy
The Minnesota Department of Natural Resources (DNR) reports
that since 1995 more than 11,000 acres of wetlandso5 0 have been lost with
only 6,000 acres of replacement wetlands created, even though the
Wetland Conservation Act ("WCA")"'5 requires that destroyed wetlands
there was a chance that the AG's Office was not notified of some claims. Conversation
b telephone on 12/07/2005.
9 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01 (West 2005) (emphasis added).
150 See http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/wetlands/types technical.html;
http://www.dnr.state.mn.us/wetlands/benefits.html for a technical definition of wetlands
and wetland types and their value as natural resources. A wetland is defined by presence
of (a) hydric soils, (b) surface or subsurface hydrology, and (c) hydrophytic vegetation
(Minnesota Rules, part 8420.0110, subpart 52). Wetlands are delineated using
procedures in the 1987 U.S. Army Corps of Engineers Wetland Delineation Manual. The
Wetland Conservation Act applies to all wetlands, except those identified on the DNR
inventory of public waters and wetlands. MN Board of Water and Soil Resources, The
Minnesota Wetland Conservation Act Manual, A Comprehensive Implementation Guide
to Minnesota's Wetland Law 6 (Ver. 1.3, Sept. 2004).
' MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 103G.221-.2373.
(a) Wetlands must not be drained or filled, wholly or partially, unless
replaced by restoring or creating wetland areas of at least equal public
value ....
(b) Replacement must be guided by the following principles in
descending order of priority:
(1) avoiding the direct or indirect impact of the activity that
may destroy or diminish the wetland; (2) minimizing the
impact by limiting the degree or magnitude of the wetland
activity and its implementation;
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be replaced at up to a two-to-one ratio. 152 Both the Minnesota DNR and
Pollution Control Agency have published re orts that even under the
WCA, wetlands are not adequately protected.' These unmitigated losses
of wetlands, the high percentage of impaired waters in Minnesota,154 and
the massive increase in sprawl based development,155 just to name a few,
illustrate the condition of resource preservation in Minnesota. It is clear
that even with MERA, Minnesota's resources are still being degraded.
There are also examples of citizen groups forgoing the legal
avenue that MERA affords due to the prohibitive cost and inability to
recover any of those costs or reasonable attorney's fees. For example, the
Nine Mile Creek Homeowners Association' 56 filed several petitions for
(3) rectifying the impact by repairing, rehabilitating, or
restoring the affected wetland environment;
(4) reducing or eliminating the impact over time by
preservation and maintenance operations during the life of the
activity;
(5) compensating for the impact by restoring a wetland; and
(6) compensating for the impact by replacing or providing
substitute wetland resources or environments.
(e) Except as provided in paragraph (f), for a wetland or public waters
wetland located on nonagricultural land, replacement must be in the
ratio of two acres of replaced wetland for each acre of drained or filled
wetland.
Id. § 103G.222 subdiv. 1.
152 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 103G.222, subdiv. 1(a). See Zander v. State, 703 N.W.2d 845,
856 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005).
153 Chris Niskanen, Minnesota Still Losing Wetlands, ST. PAUL PIONEER PRESS, January,
182005.
154 See Minnesota Pollution Control Agency,
http://www.pca.state.mn.us/publications/reports/eir-themes.pdf (last visited Oct. 20,
2006). The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency maintains a list of impaired waters that
need TMDL studies.
1ss See id. The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency and interested stakeholders
identified sprawl, and its associated issues, a high priority threat to the health of
Minnesota's environment.
156 This is a group of Hopkins, MN homeowners, led by David Rosedahl, esq. (Briggs
and Morgan PA. 612-977-8560), that were concerned that a neighboring development
proposal would destroy portions of a wetland, resulting in increased impairment of the
Nine Mile Creek watershed and increase flooding in the area. The group had little
success with the City Council or the Watershed District in attempting to place limitations
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Environmental Assessment Worksheets, worked with the local watershed
board, the Hopkins City Council, the Minnesota Environmental Quality
Board, the Minnesota DNR, and the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency
with little success.'5 7 When MERA became its last option for protecting
the wetland, the group halted their efforts as the financial cost, with no
chance of recovery, was unduly prohibitive.' 5 8 If citizens are unable to
access MERA due to the prohibitive cost with no chance of recovering
reasonable costs and attorney's fees, then the statute is not meeting the
goal as stated by the legislature, "to provide an adequate civil remedy to
protect the . . . ."159 natural resources of Minnesota.
C. Existing Attorneys'Fees Provisions in Minnesota
There is nothing new or novel about awarding attorney's fees for
citizen suits in Minnesota. One example of opportunity for recovery is
found within the Duties of the Attorney General Statute.' 60
Minnesota's Supreme Court found that where citizens brought
claims under the private attorney general statutel61 an award of attorney's
and conditions on the development proposal to safeguard against flooding and
unreasonable degradation of the wetland.
157 The group did succeed in having minimal conditions placed on the wetland permit.
See Hopkins City Council Resolution 2005-07 to 2005-08 for conditions imposed.
158 Conversations with David Rosedahl regarding constraints to continued action. See
supra note 156.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1 16B.01 (West 2005) (emphasis added).
o60 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31 subdiv. 3a.
In addition to the remedies otherwise provided by law, any person
injured by a violation of any of the laws referred to in subdivision 1
may bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and
disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable
attorney's fees, and receive other equitable relief as determined by the
court. The court may, as appropriate, enter a consent judgment or
decree without the finding of illegality. In any action brought by the
attorney general pursuant to this section, the court may award any of
the remedies allowable under this subdivision.
Id (emphasis added).
161 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31, subdiv. 3a.
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fees is authorized.162 The statute limits claims that can be brought,163 and
the claimant must prevail on the merits of the claim or in a pretrial
motion.16 Importantly, the claimant does not need to prevail on all the
claims that are made, but must prevail on a claim that allows for an award
of attorney's fees.165
The other part of Minnesota's judicial test for the award of
attorney's fees is whether the respondents' claims benefited the public.166
In determining whether or not the claim benefited the public, the relative
size of the group of persons injured is less important than how the
contested actions affected the general public.' 67 Where the general public
could be injured by the contested actions, and the claim stopped those
actions, courts will find that the claim is beneficial to the public and be
willing to award attorney fees.' 68
162 Collins v. Minn. School of Bus., 655 N.W.2d 320, 327 (2003). "[W]e conclude that
when the statute that underlies the plaintiff s cause of action allows attorney fees as part
of costs and disbursements, . . . costs and disbursements can include attorney fees." Id.
161 MIN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31 subdiv. 1.
The attorney general shall investigate violations of the law of this state
respecting unfair, discriminatory, and other unlawful practices in
business, commerce, or trade, and specifically, but not exclusively, the
nonprofit corporation act, the act against unfair discrimination and
competition, the unlawful trade practices act, the antitrust act, section
325F.67 and other laws against false or fraudulent advertising, the
antidiscrimination acts contained in section 325D.67, the act against
monopolization of food products, the act regulating telephone
advertising services, the prevention of consumer fraud act, and chapter
53A regulating currency exchanges and assist in the enforcement of
those laws as in this section provided.
Id (citations omitted).
'6 Collins, 655 N.W.2d at 327-28. See also Farmer's State Bank of Darwin v. Swisher,
631 N.W.2d 796 (Minn. 2001).
165 Collins, 655 N.W.2d at 329 (relying on Foster v. Kings Park Cent. Sch. Dist., 174
F.R.D. 19 (E.D.N.Y.1997)).
1Id. at 329; Ly v. Nystrom, 615 N.W.2d 302, 314 (Minn. 2000).
167 Collins, 655 N.W.2d at 330. The Court found that advertising, informational
presentations, sales presentations, and other contact with the public could be factored in
to how the "public at large" is affected. Id.
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The language of MERA communicates the important role that
citizens play in the protection of Minnesota's natural resourcesl 69 and the
importance of that role can only be met if citizens are truly afforded access
to the courts by allowing for recovery of their attorney's fees and costs
when they act for the benefit of the public.
IV. LANGUAGE TO ALLOW FOR RECOVERY OF FEES AND COSTS UNDER
MERA
Environmental citizen suits create avenues where the public can
engage the legal system in oversight of governmental actions, prevent
destruction of natural resources, and repair environmental damage. It is
now clear that MERA is not providing the "adequate civil remedy" as
intended, and it is not fulfilling the policy of maintaining conditions
whereby "human beings and nature can exist in productive harmony in
order that present and future generations may enjoy clean air and water,
productive land, and other natural resources with which this state has been
endowed." 70 The attorney's fees provision is vital, as MERA is not
adequately meeting its legislatively stated purpose.171
There are two options that the Minnesota Legislature can employ
to allow citizens to recover attorney's fees and costs when they sue to
protect Minnesota's natural resources from "pollution, impairment, or
destruction." 72 The first option requires amendment of the Attorney
General Statute,'7 3 and the second, preferred option, amends the MERA
statute to reflect its counterparts in other states and the federal system
which allow for recovery of fees.
These options would enhance citizens' ability to utilize MERA to
effectuate its intended policy of protecting, preserving, and enhancing the
state's air, water, land and other natural resources, for the enjoyment of
169 "[l]t is in the public interest to provide an adequate civil remedy. . . ." MINN. STAT.
ANN § 116B.01.
17o id
171 See id. for purpose.
172 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01 (West 2005). See also MICH. COMP. LAWS. ANN. §
324.1701(1).
173 The statute is found at MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31.
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present and future generations. 1 74 These options are tested, and have
proven effective in removing the onerous financial barriers to providing an
"adequate civil remedy" without resulting in an increase of abusive or
harassing lawsuits.175 This can be accomplished with simple amendments
to current Minnesota law. By not making any substantive changes in the
environmental restriction, affected interests will not be overly burdened or
blindsided by a dramatic shift in the law. Further, by utilizing existing,
time-tested language, such as the attorney's fee provision in the Clean Air
Act, or in state statutes that have been extensively litigated to determine
their meaning, Minnesota courts hopefully will not have to work to
determine their meaning because similar language has been litigated in
other judicial systems.
The following changes will afford citizens an accessible avenue to
insure that existing environmental regulations are enforced and the state
policy of protecting invaluable natural resources is upheld.
A. Incorporating MERA Into Minnesota's Private Attorney General
Provision
Minnesota's Private Attorney General Statute' 77 provides that any
person, who is injured by violation of any of the included laws, 7 "may
174 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01.
175 After an extensive survey of the relevant literature drawn together to write this paper,
no evidence has surfaced that attorney's fees provisions increase the amount of abusive
or harassing claims.
176 Clean Air Act 42 U.S.C. §§ 7604(d), 7607(f). "The court, in issuing any final order in
any action brought pursuant to subsection (a) of this section, may award costs of
litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert witness fees) to any party, whenever
the court determines such award is appropriate." Id. See, Sisk Primer, supra note 13, at
776-78, n.333. For an extensive list of relevant attorney's fee provisions in federal
environmental statutes. Id.
177 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31 subdiv. 3a.
78 Id. The private AG provision is available for claims that are within the scope of
statutes included in subdivision 1 of § 8.31. Those statutes include:
violations of the law of this state respecting unfair, discriminatory, and
other unlawful practices in business, commerce, or trade, and
specifically, but not exclusively, the nonprofit corporation act, the act
against unfair discrimination and competition, the unlawful trade
practices act, the antitrust act, section 325F.67 and other laws against
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bring a civil action and recover damages, together with costs and
disbursements, including costs of investigation and reasonable attorney's
fees."' 79
In Collins the court found that such recovery was available only
for the included statutes, and where the lawsuit benefited the public. 8 0
Therefore, by adding MERA to the list of included statutes it comes within
a court's discretion to award relevant costs and fees.' 8 '
Amendment of the Private Attorney General Statute is something
that the legislature is very capable of completing as it was amended 82 in
2005 to include the Prevention of Fraud Act 83 and the False Statement in
Advertising Act.' 84 This 2005 amendment added laws that citizens are
false or fraudulent advertising, the antidiscrimination acts contained in
section 325D.67, the act against monopolization of food products, the
act regulating telephone advertising services, the prevention of
consumer fraud act, and chapter 53A regulating currency exchanges
and assist in the enforcement of those laws as in this section provided.
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31 subdiv. 1 (citations omitted).
179 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31 subdiv. 3a.
180 Collins v. Minn. School of Bus., 655 N.W.2d 320, 327, 329 (2003). The court did not
allow recovery of attorney's fees and cost for all of the claims petitioners made, but did
allow for recovery for the claims that were within the scope of § 8.31. Id
181 Id. Fee awards under the Private AG Statute are reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id
182 See H.F. 2459, 2005 Leg., 84th Sess. (Minn. 2005), amending MINN. STAT ANN. §
8.31 subdiv. 3(a). Civil actions pursuant to subdivision 3a for violations of the
Prevention of Consumer Fraud Act (sections 325F.68 to 325F.70), or the False Statement
in Advertisement Act (section 325F.67), or other laws against false or fraudulent
advertising may be brought only by natural persons who purchase or lease goods,
services, or real estate for personal, family, or household purposes. Each such person
seeking to recover damages for violations of these sections is required to prove on an
individual basis that the deceptive act or practice caused the person to enter into the
transaction that resulted in the damages. No award of damages in an action covered by
this subdivision may be made without proof that the person seeking damages suffered an
actual out-of-pocket loss. The term 'out-of-pocket loss' means an amount of money
equal to the difference between the amount paid by the consumer for the good or service
and the actual market value of the good or service that the consumer actually received.
Any party to an action for damages under this subdivision shall have the right to demand
a jury trial. Id.
13 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 325F.68-.70 (West 2005).
8 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325F.67.
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now able to privately enforce, and recover costs and fees for their action
where it serves the public's benefit.
There are several problems with this option, the first being that
MERA does not create any substantive rights as the other statutes included
in section 8.31 do. Instead, it is procedural in that it creates standing for
"any person'"85 to file an action against "any person" for "any conduct"
"which violates, or is likely to violate, any environmental quality standard,
limitation, rule, order, license, stipulation agreement, or permit ... or any
conduct which materially adversely affects or is likely to materially
adversely affect the environment."' 86 This allows any person residing
within Minnesota to maintain a MERA action to protect natural resources
within the state from pollution, impairment, or destruction without
needing to show an individual injury.187 Because MERA creates a right to
bring a claim for any environmental transgression, inclusion of it in § 8.31
would place the broad scope of enforcement within the duties the Attorney
General is statutorily directed to investigate. 88
Inclusion of MERA in § 8.31 would vastly complicate the attorney
general statute as MERA is not a single substantive statute that the
Attorney General or citizens can investigate and enforce. It may instead
add the requirement that the Attorney General oversee the "protection,
preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land, and other natural
resources located within the state." 189 While this may be a beneficial move
for Minnesota, it is complex, unclear as to the effect, and not a politically
palatable proposition.
185 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.03 subdiv. 1.8 6 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.02 subdiv. 5.
187 See, e.g., U.S. v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705 (D. Minn. 1979); White v.
Minn. Dep't of Natural Res., 567 N.W.2d 724, 737 (Minn. Ct. App. 1997). Each
Minnesotan has a right under MERA to preserve and protect the natural resources of the
state. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group v. White Bear Rod & Gun Club, 257 N.W.2d
762, 764 (Minn. 1977).
188 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31 subdiv. 1. This section is a directive to the Attorney
General defining the scope of his enforcement and prosecution powers. While it is
arguable that Minnesota would benefit as a whole if the Attorney General were directed
to enforce environmental violations as defined in MERA it adds an unnecessary layer of
complexity to the goal of providing citizens with access to the judicial system through
MERA by allowing recovery of costs and fees. Id.
'
89 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01.
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While the attorney's fee provision in the private attorney general
statute' 90 has been tried and tested by Minnesota courts, and citizens have
been successful in recovering fees'91 for their efforts under the statute, the
inclusion of MERA in § 8.31 will not efficiently accomplish MERA's
original purpose of providing an adequate civil remedy for the protection
of Minnesota's natural resources. Incorporation of MERA into § 8.31 will
raise many questions regarding the duties of the Attorney General in
relation to MERA, the scope of claims that citizens are able to bring under
MERA for recovery in conjunction with § 8.31's attorney's fees
provisions, and the standing that is necessary to bring a claim for the
protection of the state's resources.
B. Incorporating Federal Language Waiving the American Rule into
MERA
When the Minnesota legislature was contemplating MERA in 1971
and unfortunately choose not to include the attorney's fees provision, they
made a mistake that must now be rectified if the Act is to accomplish its
stated purpose. Including the fee shifting language directly in MERA was
the best location then, just as it is now.192 The question now becomes,
where in the statute should that language be, and exactly what should it
say?
1. Original Proposed Language
One of the original versions of MERAl 93 included a simple
provision providing for:
[Attorneys' Fees; Costs; Damages.] Upon a finding against
the defendant in any action maintained under this act, the
190 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 8.31.
191 See Collins v. Minn. School of Bus., 655 N.W.2d 320 (2003).
192 Minn. S. File 471 (Feb 10, 1971) (stored at Minn. Hist. Soc'y, SAM 279 roll 2).
193 Id.
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court shall award the plaintiff reasonable attorney fees,
costs, and damages as proved.' 94
While the 1971 legislature incorrectly believed that such a
provision was not necessary,' 95 that language is useful in determining
where the current cost and fees provision will fit in the structure of the
existing act. Section 7, where the provision was originally located, is
generally concerned with the actions of the court once it has determined
the defendant is in violation of MERA. 196 In the present MERA statute,
this location most closely corresponds with Minn. Stat. § 116B.07
[Relief], as this section develops the remedies available to the court once a
violation has been found. While Minn. S. File 471 (1971) provides helpful
insight as to where in the text of MERA the attorney's fees provision
should be located, it is not necessarily a good model to incorporate into the
current MERA. The provision was not adopted by the 1971 legislature and
it has not been tested in the environmental context. Thus, it would be wise
to adopt a provision that has seen substantial judicial interpretation and
has been successfully used in environmental citizen suit litigation.
2. Federal Language
The oldest and possibly most litigated'97 attorney's fees provision
is found in § 304(d) of the Clean Air Act: "[t]he court in issuing any final
order in any action brought pursuant to subsection (a)198 of this section,
may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and expert
witness fees) to any party, whenever the court determines such an award is
appropriate."' 99
19 4 Id. § 7(7).
195 Enactment of Minn. S. File 418 (1971) without the attorney's fee provision can be
interpreted as legislative belief that allowance of fees was not necessary to fulfilling the
policy as laid out in the act.
'
96 Minn. S. File 471 1971 at § 7.
197 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 99, at 310.
'9 42 U.S.C. § 7604(a) creates a civil action against any person (including the
gOvernment) for any violation of the Clean Air Act.
99 42 U.S.C. § 7604(d) (2000).
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This provision has seen substantial litigation in interpreting the
meaning of "appropriate,"2oo and in determining when a party has
prevailed so as to justify the fee award.20' There have been numerous
federal statutes that employ this same language with regard to their own
citizen suit provisions.202 As a result, use of "appropriate," and the
preceding language, would not be a radical departure from common
practice and would not require extensive research or litigation to
determine its judicial meaning. But, the use of "appropriate" may result in
unnecessary confusion as to the plain meaning of the attorney's fee
provision. Confusion is understandable as the U.S. Supreme Court has
spent time determining what it means.203 According to Justice Rehnquist
in Ruckelshaus, "whenever it determines that such an award is
appropriate" requires that the party have some degree of success on the
merits for an award of fees to be "appropriate" within the historical
principles of fee-shifting. 204
While the language that is employed within the Clean Air Act and
with numerous other federal environmental statutes has worked for
decades, it includes unnecessarily ambiguous terms such as "appropriate."
In order for MERA to create access for citizens trying to protect the
State's resources it is essential that the tools allowing such access be clear
and free of complexities that could result in further future litigation.
C. Proposed Language for MERA
Currently, Representative Steve Simon of the Minnesota
Legislature has introduced a bill based on earlier versions of this article.205
Minnesota statutes 2004, section 116B.03, is amended by adding a
200 See Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 463 U.S. 680 (1983).
201 See Russell & Gregory, supra note 99, at 310. See also supra notes 91-109 and
accompanying text.
202 See supra note 108 for a list of these statutes.
203 See Ruckelshaus, 463 U.S. 680.
204 Id. at 682-83 (emphasis omitted).
205 Minn. H.F. 4158. As introduced in the 84th Legislative Session (2005-2006), "A bill
for an act relating to the environment; .. .providing for the award of costs in civil
actions; amending Minnesota statutes 2004, sections 116B.03, by adding a subdivision;"
Id. at § 1.
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subdivision to read: "subdiv. 6. Award of Costs: Upon motion of a party
prevailing in an action under this section, the court may award costs,
disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees and witness fees to that
party." 206 Rep. Simon's proposed language accomplishes access by clearly
and succinctly providing a two-way waiver 0 7 of the American rule.208
Further, this proposed provision is very similar to existing statutory
language in Minnesota.2 09
Section 1. Minnesota Statutes 2004, section 116B.03, is
amended by adding a subdivision to read: Subd. 6. Award
of costs. Upon motion of a party prevailing in an action
under this section, the court may award costs,
disbursements, and reasonable attorney fees and witness
fees to that party.210
Rep. Simon's proposed language will add a new subdivision to
section 3 of MERA 211 that will directly incorporate the attorney's fee
provision into the section of MERA that develops the civil suit. The
proposed language is also unambiguous as to its meaning, unlike some of
the federal waivers of the American rule, thus hopefully eliminating
inefficient litigation over the meaning of the waiver.212
This language is very similar to language in other Minnesota
environmental statutes, such as the Minnesota Environmental Response
206 id
207 Two-way waiver (also know as the "English Rule") of the American Rule allows
either party to petition the court for fees and costs when they are the prevailing party. See
sufra Part 2(A).
Minn. H.F. 4158.2 01 See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 115B.14 (West 2005) (Minnesota Environmental Response
and Liability Act). "Upon motion of a party prevailing in an action under sections
1 15B.01 to 1 15B.15 the court may award costs, disbursements and reasonable attorney
fees and witness fees to that party." Id.210 Minn. H.F. 4158.
211 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 1 16B.03. This section creates standing for citizens to sue under
MERA.
212 See supra Part 4(B).
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and Liability Act (MERAL).213 MERLA's attorney fees provision has
been litigated and a reviewing court found that the district court has
discretion in awarding fees to the prevailing party. That award decision
would only be disturbed if there is a clear abuse of that discretion.214 in
calculating fees arising from the MERLA provision the court used the
well-accepted lodestar method215 by multiplying the number of hours
reasonably expended on the case by a reasonable hourly rate. 216
Representative Simon's language can easily be implemented, as it
is uncomplicated and clear in its effect on the citizen suit provision of
MERA. It will allow the prevailing party,2 17 either plaintiff or defendant,
to recover some of the expenses associated with litigating the case. This
will have effects that are beneficial to both industry and public interest
groups. Suits with just enough merit to not be frivolous, but that can delay
industrial actions will be discouraged because the bringer of the claim may
have to bear the opposition's cost. Citizens concerned with the health of
Minnesota's resources will benefit, as they will be able to afford to bring
suits to protect those resources through recovery of the attorney's fees and
costs of the litigation.
CONCLUSION
For the last three decades MERA has failed to provide
Minnesotans with an "adequate civil remedy" as the legislature promised
in its poetic mission statement of the statute. The air, water, land, and
other natural resources have suffered pollution, impairment, and
destruction because of that failing. As a result, Minnesota's citizens, both
present and future, have suffered and will continue to suffer.
213 MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1 15B.01-.241. "Upon motion of a party prevailing in an action
under sections 1 15B.01 to 1 15B. 15 the court may award costs, disbursements and
reasonable attorney fees and witness fees to that party." MNN. STAT. ANN. § 1 15B.14.2 14 Kennedy Building Assoc. v. Viacom, Inc., 375 F.3d 731, 748 (8th Cir. 2004).
215 See supra Part 2(B) for discussion of the lodestar method.
"' Kennedy Building Assoc., 375 F.3d at 748.
217 Gopher Oil Co., Inc. v. Union Oil Co., 757 F. Supp. 998, 1005 (D. Minn. 1991).
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It is the right of each Minnesotan to protect the state's resourceS218
by amending MERA to allow for the recovery of costs, citizens are
afforded greater court access to exercise that right. MERA is a powerful
statute that can contribute to the maintenance of the invaluable natural
resources of Minnesota if it is amended as H.F. No. 4158 proposes.
218 MINN. STAT. ANN. § 116B.01 states "[E]ach person is entitled by right to the
protection, preservation, and enhancement of air, water, land, and other natural resources
located within the state . . . ."
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